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Milton Friedman on the Federal Reserve

71 passages for “the Federal Reserve”, 58 checked against the source. Page 4 of 8.

Full topic page: Monetary policy and the Federal Reserve

  1. I then attributed the divergence of promise from performance to misunderstanding. The men who run the Fed, I wrote, have “taken the behavior of interest rates rather than the quantity of money as their guide—and this mistake has led them far astray from their intended path.”
    The Inflationary Fed
    Column, 1973, Newsweek, August 27, 1973; reprinted in the Congressional Record, Extensions of Remarks, November 7, 1973, p. 36327, introduced by Representative Robert Huber of Michigan as “Mr. Milton Friedman’s article that appeared in Newsweek of August 27, 1973”, Congressional Record, November 7, 1973, p. 36327
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  2. The widespread impression that the Fed has tightened is based on the mistake of judging monetary policy by interest rates, which the Fed cannot control, rather than by the quantity of money, which it can. The quantity of money is still growing as rapidly as it has for the past four years.
    Perspective on Inflation
    Column, 1974, Newsweek (June 1974); reprinted in the Congressional Record, Extensions of Remarks, June 18, 1974, pp. 19786 to 19787, introduced by Representative Jack Kemp of New York, who calls it “his column this week in Newsweek.” The reprint gives no issue date, and the chart that ran with the column is not reproduced, Congressional Record, June 18, 1974, pp. 19786 to 19787
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  3. The sharper response of production than of prices is typical. An inflationary process, once underway, develops an inertia of its own. It takes an economic slowdown to stop the acceleration of prices and, even then, it takes a long time to restore price stability. That is why it is so important to prevent inflation from gaining momentum.
    Monetary Policy
    Column, 1968, Newsweek (June 3, 1968); reprinted in the House Banking and Currency Committee’s 1968 Compendium on Monetary Policy Guidelines and Federal Reserve Structure, pp. 225–226, p. 226 of the 1968 House reprint
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  4. My own prescription is still that the monetary authority go all the way in avoiding such swings by adopting publicly the policy of achieving a steady rate of growth in a specified monetary total. The precise rate of growth, like the precise monetary total, is less important than the adoption of some stated and known rate.
    The Role of Monetary Policy
    Journal article, 1968, American Economic Review 58, no. 1 (March 1968), pp. 1–17; reprinted in the House Banking and Currency Committee’s 1968 Compendium on Monetary Policy Guidelines and Federal Reserve Structure, pp. 214–224, p. 223 of the 1968 House reprint
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  5. The Fed’s repeated failure to achieve its own targets has produced an impression that it cannot do so, that it is a helpless giant buffeted by events over which it has no control. That impression is false. The Fed’s failure does not reflect a lack of means. It reflects the Fed’s tardiness in adjusting its operating procedures to the change in its announced objectives.
    Improving Monetary Policy
    Column, 1980, Newsweek, July 28, 1980; reprinted in the Congressional Record, Extensions of Remarks, July 28, 1980, p. 20026, introduced by Representative Robert Dornan of California, who gives the column as appearing in the Newsweek issue “dated July 28, 1980”, Congressional Record, July 28, 1980, p. 20026
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  6. The Fed is supposedly independent. But, as Dooley said of the Supreme Court, “It follows the election returns.” Its behavior reminds me of nothing so much as the remark attributed to a U.S. Army officer in Vietnam, “We destroyed the village in order to save it.” Similarly, the Fed refrains from using its independence because it is afraid of losing it.
    Why Inflation Persists
    Column, 1977, Newsweek (October 3, 1977); reprinted in full in the Congressional Record, Extensions of Remarks, September 29, 1977, p. 31684, introduced by Representative Parren J. Mitchell of Maryland, who gives it as appearing “in the October 3, 1977, issue of Newsweek”, Congressional Record, September 29, 1977, p. 31684
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  7. The only way you could get the inflation down was by having monetary contraction. There was no way you could do that without having a temporary recession. The great error in the earlier period had been that whenever there was a little contraction there was a tendency to expand the money supply rapidly in order to avoid unemployment. That stop-and-go policy was really what bedeviled the Fed during the '60s and '70s.
    Commanding Heights: Milton Friedman interview
    Interview, 2000, PBS, “On Ronald Reagan,” interview conducted October 1, 2000
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  8. Another defect of the conduct of monetary policy through an independent central bank that has a good deal of leeway and power is the extent to which the policy is thereby made highly dependent on personalities. In studying the history of American monetary policy, I have been struck by the extraordinary importance of accidents of personality.
    Should There Be an Independent Monetary Authority?
    Journal article, 1962, In Search of a Monetary Constitution, ed. Leland B. Yeager (Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 219–243; reprinted in the House Banking and Currency Committee’s 1968 Compendium on Monetary Policy Guidelines and Federal Reserve Structure, pp. 205–214, p. 211 of the 1968 House reprint
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  9. The Federal Reserve system had been established to prevent what actually happened. It was set up to avoid a situation in which you would have to close down banks, in which you would have a banking crisis. And yet, under the Federal Reserve system, you had the worst banking crisis in the history of the United States. There's no other example I can think of, of a government measure which produced so clearly the opposite of the results that were intended.
    Commanding Heights: Milton Friedman interview
    Interview, 2000, PBS, “The Great Depression,” interview conducted October 1, 2000
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  10. I should like to emphasize that I do not regard this proposal as a be-all and end-all of monetary management, as a rule which is somehow to be written in tablets of gold and enshrined for all future time. ( … ) Such a rule seems to me the only feasible device currently available for converting monetary policy into a pillar of a free society rather than a threat to its foundation.
    Should There Be an Independent Monetary Authority?
    Journal article, 1962, In Search of a Monetary Constitution, ed. Leland B. Yeager (Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 219–243; reprinted in the House Banking and Currency Committee’s 1968 Compendium on Monetary Policy Guidelines and Federal Reserve Structure, pp. 205–214, p. 214 of the 1968 House reprint
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